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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QU RTERLY 
Volume 19, Number 1, January 1982 
VII. ARE THERE MENTAL INFERENCES 
IN DIRECT PERCEPTIONS? 
DAN D. CRAWFORD 
W HILE there is virtually a consensus among contemporary philosophers of perception 
that some form of direct realism is true, there is 
less than complete agreement about whether nor- 
mal, direct perceptions involve mental inferences 
in any sense. In taking another look at this recur- 
rent question, my aim is twofold: first, to examine 
some of the arguments and evidences that have 
been offered in favor of inferences and to see if 
they can be accommodated within the direct realist 
framework, and second, to attempt to clarify and 
defend the insight of direct realism that normal 
perceptions are noninferential. 
Let us recall the two central claims of direct 
realism. First, as a form of realism it accepts from 
common sense the idea that the world includes 
among its constituents physical objects having 
sensible properties and existing unperceived. The 
second and distinctive thesis of direct realism is 
that perceiving organisms are capable of having 
direct or noninferential knowledge of these same 
physical objects and their sensible properties. In 
normal circumstances, someone's perceiving that 
there is a red book in front of him is a case of 
knowing that there is a red book in front of him. 
And what one perceives and has knowledge of in 
this case is the actual physical book in its physical 
surroundings. 
But what exactly is meant when it is said that 
this knowledge is "direct" and "noninferential"? 
The answer given by direct realists has a positive 
and a negative side. On the one hand, they assert 
that our perceptual judgments refer to external 
physical things, and on the other hand, they deny 
that normally we make any additional judgments 
that refer to items other than physical things. In 
particular, it is denied that the immediate objects 
of perceptual experience are sense data or sense 
impressions on which we base our perceptual 
judgments about physical things. Hence the direct 
realist asserts that perceptual knowledge is direct 
and noninferential in the sense that it does not in- 
volve an inference from a prior knowledge and 
awareness of sensory items to the perceptual judg- 
ment about physical things. 
There is a second sense in which it may be said 
that normal perceptions are directly of physical 
things, namely that it is physical things in their 
physical settings that are phenomenologically 
present in perception. Consider this remark from 
Romane Clark: 
Perceptions are directly of things and happenings in our 
physical surroundings. 'Directly' here means that however 
complicated the causal path may be from environment to 
perception, what we experience are items of our physical en- 
vironment and not surrogates, or images, or intermediaries 
of them.' 
In this passage, Clark seems to be making a 
phenomenological claim about what is present in 
our perceptual experience, or at least what he is 
saying depends on such a claim. And the claim can 
hardly be denied: it would be grossly inaccurate to 
describe what is present in our perceptual ex- 
perience when we look at a large tree as a fleeting, 
mental sense datum, image, or appearance. What 
we take ourselves to be encountering in this ex- 
perience is rather a very substantial part of the ex- 
ternal world. 
We should keep the distinction between these 
two senses of "direct" clearly in mind in order to 
guard against a possible fallacious argument 
against inferences. For it might be argued that 
since the things and happenings that we perceive 
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are uninferred in the sense that they are present in of experience, and not a physiological occurrence 
experience, then the corresponding perceptual in the eye or brain. 
judgments must likewise be uninferred from any 
antecedent judgments. But this would be a I. COMMON SENSE AND INFERENCE 
mistake for it is perfectly possible to maintain 
both that ordinary perceptual judgments are con- We do  not usually think of peceptions as in- 
clusions of inferences, and that the things intend- ferential. Rather we are accustomed to think that 
ed by these culminating judgments are what is we make inferences from the things that are pres- 
finally perceived and present in the experience. In ent in perception to things that are not Present. 
the remainder of this paper, we will be concerned For example, when I claim to see from the swelling 
mainly with whether normal perceptual judgments On daughter's arm that she has a mosquito 
are products of inferential reasoning from antece- bite, sense would be to  admit that I 
dent judgments. had made an inference, though not a conscious 
What is an inference? and why should anyone one, from what I do perceive, the swelling, to 
think that the term can be applied to the mental what I do  not perceive, that the swelling was 
caused by a mosquito. If I find out that my 
activity that occurs in perception? The primary perceptual belief was mistaken and that what I ac- 
use of the term occurs in the context of forensics. tually perceived was a pimple and not a mosquito 
We make inferences when we in thought bite, then I might say that I had wrongly inferred from a premise to a conclusion, taking the premise that the swelling on her arm was caused by a mas- 
to be a reason or evidence for our conclusion. A qUitO. sense not admit that 
further implication of the common meaning of perceptions of ordinary objects such as arms and 
an inference-one which is often swellings involve inferences. The reason for this 
overlooked by philosophers- is that the subject 
seems to be simply that these objects are present in 
must in sense be aware 'f the premise which our experience, and as such are not inferred. Ad- 
is the basis of his inference. Anthony Quinton 
mittedly there is no sharp line separating is 
makes a closely related point about inferences in present and what is not present in experience. But 
perception: ordinary objects such as arms and swellings can be 
inferred only if there is something more basic that 
If [an inferential theory of perception] is correct two condi- is perceived from which the inference can be 
tions must be satisfied. Statements about experience must 
count as reasons or evidence for statements about objects made, and common sense does not recognize any 
and they must in some, no doubt rather obscure, sense be ac- such things. 
cepted by those who make statements about objects .... A A further point that this case brings to light is 
fact cannot be a man's reason or evidence for an assertion that common sense willingly speaks of an in- 
unless, however implicitly, he is aware of it.' ference even though there is no conscious process 
of inferring. I judge immediately that what I 
This primary use of "inference" will guide us in perceive is a mosquito bite. I am not aware of any 
our investigation of perceptual inferences. If or- inferential step by which I pass from an awareness 
dinary perceptual judgments are the result of in- of the swelling to a conclusion about its cause. 
ference, then the following conditions must be This enables us to see that the absence of any con- 
met: 1) whatever plays the role of premise in the scious process of inferring is not a criterion for the 
inference must be a state which occurs prior to the absence of any inferring at all. Indeed if it were, 
perceptual judgment; 2) the subject must in some then it would have to  be allowed that even 
way be aware of this State. We may note im- judgments about the pathways of subatomic par- 
mediately that the second condition assures that ticles and about other people's feelings and 
whatever functions as a premise must be an item thoughts are not mediated by inference, since 
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these judgments need not involve any conscious 
reasoning. But we certainly do not want to go this 
far in disallowing inferences. 
Let us now turn our attention to some of the 
reasons for thinking that perceptions are, after all, 
conclusions of inferences, and that the verdict of 
common sense must be reversed. We will deal first 
with an argument proposed by Gilbert Harmon 
based on a certain understanding of perceptual 
knowledge; next we will consider the implications 
of the attempts of cognitive psychologists to ex- 
plain perceptual illusions; and finally we will ex- 
amine the implications of the idea, accepted by 
direct realism, that perceptions are mediated by 
sense impressions. 
If perceptions are instances of knowing, then 
the judgments (and beliefs) included in them must 
be justified, and it is reasonable to think that or- 
dinary perceptual beliefs are not self-justifying, 
but are justified through other beliefs. Gilbert 
Harmon, in his recent book Thought, has argued 
that it is necesary to invoke inferences from 
perceptual evidence in order to explain both or- 
dinary direct perceptions as well as "Gettier ex- 
amples involving direct perceptual kn~wledge."~ 
These Gettier examples are "easily accounted for" 
if we suppose that direct perceptual knowledge is 
based on inference, but not otherwise. One of the 
examples discussed is as follows: 
A man looks and comes to believe that there is a candle 
directly before him. There is a candle there; but a mirror in- 
tervenes to show the reflection of a candle actually off to 
one side. The man's belief is justified and true; but he does 
not know. If his belief is the result of inference, his failure to 
know is easy to understand. Since inference attempts to find 
the best total exaplanatory account, he infers an explanation 
of the way things look. He infers that it looks to him as if 
there were a candle before him because there is a candle 
there and because of the normal connection between the way 
things look and the way things are. Since that explanation is 
essential to his conclusion but is false, he does not come to 
know that there is a candle before him even though his belief 
is justified and true." 
According to Harmon's explanation, the man is 
making this inference: 
1) it looks as if there is a candle over there 
2) normally, when things look a certain way it is because 
they are that way 
3) present circumstances are normal 
4) so, it looks as if there is a candle over there because there 
is a candle over there. 
It should be noted that the conclusion of the man's 
inference involves a claim about the cause of his 
perceptual experience. Harmon is certainly correct 
in saying that what the man concludes is not sim- 
ply that there is a candle in front of him, but also 
that there is an unbroken causal connection be- 
tween the candle and his perceptual state. Conse- 
quently, what the man believes about the percep- 
tual object is not entirely true, and therefore can- 
not be an instance of knowing. 
And yet we may still wonder whether it is 
necessary to postulate an inference in this case. 
The perceptual evidence that is leading our man 
astray is his mistaken belief that perceptual condi- 
tions are normal. We know that conditions are not 
normal, and so we are in a position to see that his 
perceptual belief about the object and its relation 
to him rests on a mistaken belief. But even if the 
man's perceptual belief (so far as he knows) is sup- 
ported by his belief that conditions are normal, it 
is not clear that this latter belief is the premise of 
an inference. It should be noted that our man's 
belief that conditions are normal is itself a com- 
plex perceptual belief which has its own justifying 
evidence. But is it plausible to think that when the 
man looks at what is before him, he first judges 
that conditions are normal, and then judges that a 
candle is there? It is far more probable that when 
his senses are appropriately stimulated, the belief 
that conditions are normal arises concurrently 
with the belief that the candle is there. And if this 
is so, then the former belief cannot serve as the 
premise of an inference. Our examination of this 
case shows that one can have and give evidence for 
one's perceptual belief without its being true that 
one has used this evidence in a process of in- 
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ference. Similarly, one can have reasons for judg- 
ing that a particular act of killing is wrong without 
having arrived at this judgment by a process of 
reasoning. 
There is, however, another deeper issue raised 
by Harmon's inferential theory, namely whether 
direct perception should be understood on the 
model of inferences to the best total explanation 
of one's sense experience. For we can agree that 
sense experiences do  occur before the perceptual 
belief. We will deal with this important issue in a 
later section of this paper. 
Do the explanations of normal perceptions 
given by cognitive psychologists give evidence for 
unconscious inferences? We will attempt to 
answer this question by considering a case of 
perceptual illusion, for we have learned from 
perceptual psychology that the very same 
mechanisms that determine normal perceptions 
also produce the illusions. 
Consider the familiar Muller-Lyer illusion 
figures in which the vertical axial lines A and B, 
though objectively equal, appear unequal. 
The perceptual psychologist, R. L. Gregory, has 
given a plausible explanation of this illusion in 
terms of perspective-depth cues suggested by the 
line configurations which elicit the mechanism of 
size-constancy s ~ a l i n g . ~  The figures are perceived 
as simple perspective drawings suggesting depth. 
The lines going out from A are (unconsciously) 
seen as coming toward the perceiver, as when the 
corner of a room is viewed; the lines going toward 
B are seen as going away from the perceiver, as 
when the near corner of a building is viewed. A is 
then perceived as more distant than B on the basis 
of these distance cues, and consequently A is 
enlarged due to a "perceptual compensation" 
which holds the size of objects nearly constant 
despite variations in their perceived distance. It is, 
then, the perceived depth of A in comparison with 
B which is responsible for the enlargement of A. 
What are the implications of this account for in- 
ferences? Let us suppose that the relevant content 
of the perceptual judgment in this case is that the 
vertical line A is larger in size than the correspond- 
ing line B. It is reasonable to interpret Gregory as 
saying that this perceptual judgment is the result 
of a mistaken inference from an antecedent sense 
experience of equal lines. We can reconstruct the 
pattern of this unconscious inference as follows: 
1)  it looks as if lines A and B are equal 
2) it looks as if A is more distant than B 
3) if two objects have the same apparent size, but one ap- 
pears more distant, then the more distant object is larger 
4) so, A is larger than B.6 
The main argument in favor of this inferential 
hypothesis is that it seems to be implicit in the 
given psychological explanation of the illusion. 
After all, the thrust of that explanation is that the 
perceiver is engaged in a process of size-scaling, 
that is, enlarging one line and diminishing the 
other, and that this revision is the resuit of a 
perceived variation in distance. Gregory 
acknowledges that the factor of distance or depth 
is not finally "seen," it is only "indicated" by the 
lines. But he also shows that the lines can be seen 
as varying in distance in special circumstances in 
which they are viewed as luminous figures against 
an invisible background, and moreover that the 
perceived distortions in size are "very highly cor- 
related" with this apparent depth.' It is difficult to  
avoid the conclusion that when one views the illu- 
sion, one is somehow taking account of depth at a 
deeper level of perception. The inferential 
hypothesis, then, seems to be correct, in saying 
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that the subject moves by an unconscious in- 
ference from a primary experience of equal lines 
that look as if they vary in distance to the percep- 
tual conclusion that the lines are unequal. 
But we should query whether this account is 
correct in identifying this primary experience of 
equal lines with a sensation. For suddenly it dawns 
on us that the experience has all the characteristics 
of a perceptual state. It involves an intentional 
reference to things outside the perceiver, viz. lines 
that are spatially related. The experience is an 
elementary taking, and as such lacks the character 
of givenness that has traditionally been ascribed to 
sensations. Thus it seems we must modify the in- 
ferential account we have given to say tht the sub- 
ject makes a calculation based upon a prior 
minimal perception of equal lines varying in 
distance. 
What can be said about our awareness of 
underlying perceptions of this sort? We have laid 
it down as a condition of making an inference that 
the subject must be implicitly aware of the 
premises of his inference. Since we are not con- 
sciously aware of the depth-perspective cues in the 
Muller-Lyer figures, then our modified inferential 
account must hold that we are unconsciously 
aware of these factors, where this means not only 
that we are experiencing them but that we have 
some idea or conceptualization of what we are ex- 
periencing. 
There are several considerations which make it 
plausible to think that the minimal perceptions we 
have described are awarenesses. First, we should 
note that it is common to speak of unconscious 
awarenesses in other contexts such as Freudian 
psychology with its acceptance of unconscious 
desires and beliefs, as well as recent theories of 
language that explain linguistic competence in 
terms of the unconscious knowledge and applica- 
tion of a system of rules. Second, in viewing the 
premises of our inferences as perceptual states, in 
which the subject makes an intentional reference 
to external objects, we make them suitable can- 
didates for awarenesses. And finally, the fact that 
the subject can become consciously aware of the 
perspective cues in the drawings, and in some 
cases can even cancel their effect and come to see 
the lines as equal, suggests that he was visually 
aware of equal lines even before he gained an 
understanding of the illusion. 
The instance of perceptual illusion that we have 
examined has implications for normal perception. 
For it is reasonable to suppose that other instances 
of size-constancy scaling that result in veridical 
perceptions also involve mental inferences. While 
the conclusions of these inferences are not direct 
perceptions in the sense of being uninferred, 
nevertheless since they are inferred from minimal 
direct perceptions and not sensations, then the in- 
ferential theory we have defended is not in conflict 
with the central thesis of direct realism- that nor- 
mal perceptions are not inferred from sensory 
states. Finally, we allow that our inferences 
culminate in visual experiences, and that what is 
inferred is directly perceived in the sense that it is 
present in the subject's experience. 
IV. ARE SENSE IMPRESSIONS PREMISES 
OF INFERENCES? 
If all perceptions are mediated by antecedent 
sense impressions, then it may be that we are 
aware of these sense impressions and pass from 
them by an inference to our perceptual conclu- 
sions. While direct realists generally agree that 
there are sense impressions, they do not agree 
about how to characterize them or about their role 
in perception. We will begin our discussion by 
giving a constructive account of sense impressions 
which draws heavily on the theory put forward in 
recent years by Wilfrid S e l l a r ~ . ~  We will then go 
on to consider whether sense impressions can 
figure in perceptual inferences. 
Since, according to direct realism, our percep- 
tual judgments refer to physical objects and their 
properties, and since it is these physical objects 
that are present in the perceptual experience, then 
sense impressions are not the immediate objects of 
perceptual awareness. They are not rival objects 
of perception. We must postulate sense impres- 
sions to explain certain features of perception, 
which means that they are inferred entities in yet 
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another sense of this slippery word. 
We theorize that sense impressions are mental 
occurrences that intervene between the physical 
stimulus and the final perceptual awareness. As 
such, we may expect that sense impressions have 
properties that link them to their physical stimula- 
tions, but also properties that provide the "raw 
material" for their consequent, full-blown percep- 
tions. To  account for our awareness of perceptible 
objects, we attribute to the sensory state proper- 
ties which correspond to, but are not identical 
with, their sensible properties. When holding a 
ball in one's hand in normal conditions, and 
perceiving by touch that it is a ball, one has a sense 
impression of something 'spherical', 'hard', and 
'smooth' (where the single quotes indicate the 
unique predicates that designate properties of sen- 
sory states). 
Accordingly, the perceptual process should be 
understood as having three separate stages, 
causally linked: the purely physical stimulus, 
which gives rise to the mental sense impression, 
which in turn gives rise to  the "conceptually rich" 
perception. But it will not do to say simply that 
sense impressions causally mediate perceptual 
awarenesses, for they have a far more intimate 
connection with those awarenesses. We can only 
account for the sensuous, nonpropositional 
character of perceptual states, if we accept a 
strong form of the Kantian doctrine that the sen- 
sory "matter" is literally taken up into the percep- 
tual experience and seamlessly united with 
it - although as we shall see in a moment it can be 
significantly altered in the process.1° 
What, then, must be added to this admittedly 
crude sketch of sense impressions in order to per- 
mit them to serve as premises of inferences? As we 
have seen, the subject must be aware of them in a 
sense which implies that he has formed some idea 
of them. Consequently, those philosophers who 
wish to say that perceptual judgments are in- 
ferences from sense impressions must hold either 
that sensing is itself a kind of knowing, or if it is 
not that we have direct knowledge of our sense im- 
pressions whenever they occur. 
We may now take note of the fact that direct 
realists hold divergent views on this point. Wilfrid 
Sellars argues that sense impressions are "non- 
conceptual representations" that we are not nor- 
mally aware of; Roderick Chisholm, on the other 
hand, holds that whenever we are sensing in some 
way we know that we are sensing in that way." 
Since philosophers have always maintained the 
closest connection between being in a conceptual 
state, and being aware that one is in that state, 
then the question of inferences seems to boil down 
to whether or not we are always aware of how we 
are sensing. 
Presumably, we are sometimes aware of how we 
are sensing in the (dispositional) sense that we can 
give noninferential reports about how we are sens- 
ing. I can know noninferentially that I am sensing 
'intense heat', or that I am sensing something 
'spherical', 'hard', and 'smooth'. But granting this, 
it is still highly doubtful that we are always aware 
of how we are sensing. My chief reason for saying 
this is that there seem to be many cases in which 
there are great discrepancies between what is 
sensed and what is perceived. In our earlier discus- 
sion of the Muller-Lyer illusion we found a 
disparity between the way the two lines appeared 
in conscious perception (as unequal in size), and 
the way they appeared at a more primary, but un- 
conscious, level of perception (as equal in size, but 
varying in distance). We referred to the latter ap- 
pearing as a minimal perception. We should ex- 
pect to find even greater disparities between 
perceptions (minimal or maximal) and their 
underlying sensory stimulations. 
Let us look at a case of such a discrepancy, one 
which will also help to clarify the idea that sense 
impressions are postulated occurrences. The 
psychologist, Grace Adams, related the following 
quaint but revealing personal experience: 
I was looking out of a window, watching for the streetcar, 
and 1 saw through the shrubs by the fence the brilliant red 
slats of the familiar truck; just patches of red, brilliant 
scarlet. As I looked, it occurred to me that what I was really 
seeing were dead leaves on a tree; instantly the scarlet 
changed to a dull chocolate brown.I2 
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Adams then states that she tried to "recover the 
red" by imagining the streetcar, and found that 
she could "redden the leaves somewhat," but could 
not obtain the original scarlet. Nor could she 
recover entirely the later dull brown color. Finally, 
she reports, she went out to see what the actual 
color of the leaves was and found it to be a dis- 
tinctly reddish brown color. 
What should we say about Adams' sense ex- 
perience as her perceptual experience changes 
from brilliant red to chocolate brown? Let us limit 
our discussion to the aspect of color. A possible 
view is that Adams is not sensing any colors that 
she does not perceive: she is not sensing brown at 
the time she perceives the red slats, nor is she sens- 
ing red at the time she perceives the brown leaves. 
One might take this line if one wished to avoid 
having to postulate sense experiences of which we 
are not consciously aware. But this is a highly im- 
plausible view. It seems rather that there must be 
some basis in the sense experience for these alter- 
nate perceptual states. Adams must be sensing 
reddish brown throughout the experience, though 
unconsciously, while perceptually judging and see- 
ing, first, due to her strong expectation, that the 
red streetcar is behind the leaves, and second, that 
there are only dull brown leaves there. 
What stands out in bold relief from this exam- 
ple is that our sense impressions are not always on 
the surface of, and discoverable in, conscious ex- 
perience. Furthermore, this case is interesting 
because what is sensed is not merely supplemented 
in the perception, but positively revised and over- 
ruled. The reddish-brown sense experience is 
transformed into a brilliant red perceptual ex- 
perience. In order to recover her original sense ex- 
perience, Adams had to cast off her perceptual 
awareness that the brilliant red streetcar was there. 
Her final perceptual judgment that there were 
reddish-brown leaves before her was the percep- 
tion that most faithfully reproduced her sense ex- 
perience. 
There are many illustrations in the textbooks of 
perceptual psychology of this kind of case in 
which there are large discrepancies between what 
is sensed and what is perceived. Indeed it may be 
said that the main task of the psychology of 
perception is to reveal the disparities between sen- 
sation and aspects of the commonly perceived 
world such as the permanence of objects, their 
motion, and "constancy" of size, shape, and 
brightness, and to specify the perceptual struc- 
tures and laws that account for these differences. 
Commenting on the perception of shape and mo- 
tion, Julian Hochberg writes: "The sensations 
seem to become completely unobservable, and 
totally submerged in the overall organization of 
the perceived object."13 It is this "submerged" 
character of sensations that should give pause to 
those who wish to say that we are always aware of 
how we are sensing, and consequently to those 
who support inferential processes. 
We can probe more deeply the question at issue 
by asking whether a sense impression is itself a 
conceptual state. At what point in the perceptual 
process does one begin to respond thinkingly, and 
by means of concepts, to information from the 
body? Is it at the level of sensation, or at some 
higher level? The question cuts deeply, and 
crystallizes opposing theories in the philosophy of 
mind. Ultimately, our judgment about inferences 
depends on the answer we give to this question. 
We can perhaps throw some light on this dif- 
ficult issue by suggesting what seems to be a 
natural way of grouping the relevant terms. We 
note, first, that at the level of sense experience one 
does not represent things as being outside of one's 
body in physical space. What is sensed does not in- 
clude what Gustav Bergmann calls "the idea of ex- 
ternal e~istence."'~ Further, it seems reasonable to 
take this absence of externality as a sign that the 
subject has not begun to conceptualize a world. 
We therefore propose that we should speak of a 
subject's conceptual activity only at the level at 
which he begins to represent physical objects stan- 
ding over and against his own physical being. 
More simply, we should speak of a subject's con- 
ceptual activity only when he begins to perceive 
the world, for perception is essentially a state or 
condition in which a subject of experience 
represents, and gains knowledge of, physical 
things. This proposal has the effect of reinforcing 
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the distinction between nonconceptual sensations 
and conceptual perceptions, and if it has any basis 
in our understanding of these concepts, as 1 think 
it does, then it provides additional support for the 
central thesis of direct realism that sensations are 
not themselves thoughts that function as premises 
of inferences. 
The aim of this paper has been to clarify and de- 
fend the central insight of direct realism that nor- 
mal perceptions of physical things are noninferen- 
tial in the sense that they are not the product of in- 
ferences from antecedent sensory states. Three 
lines of argument, opposed to direct realism, and 
in favor of perceptual inferences, were considered 
and found wanting. First, a consideration of the 
requirements of perceptual knowledge revealed 
that perceptual beliefs are indeed based on 
evidence, but this fact does not commit us to a 
theory of perception as an "inference to the best 
A lbright College 
total explanation" as Gilbert Harmon argue\. 'I  he 
fact that we have and can give evidence for thew 
beliefs does not imply that we have used t h i j  
evidence in a process of inference. Second, a 
careful examination of the explanation given by 
cognitive psychologists of the familiar Muller- 
Lyer illusion led to the conclusion that cases of 
this sort give evidence for saying that many or- 
dinary perceptions are the result of inferences 
from minimal perceptions, although not from sen- 
sory states. Finally, those opponents of direct 
realism who accept the thesis that normal percep- 
tions are inferences based upon antecedent sense 
impressions must also accept the thesis that we are 
normally cognitively aware of these sense impres- 
sions. However, consideration of a paradigmatic 
case in which there was seen to be a major 
discrepancy between the sensory state and its con- 
sequent perception made it implausible to think 
that sense impressions are usually accessible to in- 
trospective awareness. Hence the mental processes 
by which we pass from what is sensed to what is 
perceived should not be viewed as inferential.'" 
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